sabato 26 agosto 2017

Weekly News Roundup: Dispatches from the Silk Road Economic Belt


Chinese investors warned of dangers that lie in wait along the new Silk Road

Public and private institutions are mapping risks for participants in Belt and Road Initiative (Scmp)

China defends Pakistan after Trump calls Pakistan a terrorist haven 
A survey conducted by Pew Research Centre in 2014 showed that Pakistan is China’s strongest supporter in Asia as 78 percent of Pakistanis view China favourably. The strong preference doesn’t come out of nothing. China seems to be the only nation that dare to defend Pakistan against the United States. On 21 August, the U.S. President Donald J. Trump issued his grand strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, aiming to comprehensively crush terrorism in the region. Hua implied that the United States hasn’t fully recognized Pakistan’s efforts in the international community. Of course, as the nation which does fully recognize Pakistan’s sacrifice, China also “supports the international community in enhancing the international counter-terrorism cooperation and forming synergy.” (TheDiplomat)


China committed to help bring peace to Afghanistan, but Pakistan’s role in process must be respected, says top diplomat
China’s top diplomat Yang Jiechi said during a phone call with US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on Wednesday that his government was committed to bringing peace to Afghanistan, but also called on the Trump administration to recognise the role of Pakistan in the process. (Scmp)

U.S. Shift Boosts Afghans, Risks Pushing Pakistan Toward China
The Trump administration’s new Afghan strategy bolstered Kabul in its fight against the Taliban, but officials and analysts in Pakistan warned that Washington’s approach risks fueling the 16-year war in Afghanistan and encourages Islamabad to deepen ties with China. (WSJ)

TRUMP BEWARE: PAKISTAN’S LUCK PLAYING CHINA CARD IS TURNING
When the bin Laden raid sent US-Pakistan ties into a tailspin, Beijing rebuffed the advances of Islamabad. But six years on, as relations head south once again, China’s calculus has changed (scmp)

Chinese company seeking railway revival to invest in Afghan marble sector
A delegation of Qin Gen Industrial Company of China, headed by deputy general manager Li Yingjun, has met officials with Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industries (ACCI) and a number of businessmen and emphasized on joint efforts to enhance cooperation on infrastructures including railway connectivity and trade under the Belt and Road Initiative.Expressing interest in investment in Afghan minerals extraction, Li said the company wants to invest in marble filed and its import. (Xinhua)

Central China transportation hub sees 200 Sino-European freight trains this year
Central China's Wuhan city, a transportation hub, has seen more than 200 Sino-European freight trains so far this year, said local authorities on Saturday. As of Friday, 100 freight trains between China and Europe have left Wuhan, and the city received 103. A total of 18,000 containers were carried, up 41.5 percent from last year, according to Wuhan Asia-Europe Logistics which runs the trains. By May 13 this year when the 1,000th Sino-European freight train left China, the country had 51 Sino-European freight train routes, with trains from 28 Chinese cities travelling to 29 cities in 11 European countries. (People's Daily)

Eurasia high speed railway from Germany to China can be built by 2026
Construction of the Eurasia high speed railway (HSR) connecting Europe to China can be completed by 2026, Russian Railways said in its presentation available with TASS. Construction start at different segment varies from 2018 (Moscow - Kazan HSR) to 2023 (Krasnoye-Moscow and Chelyabinsk - Zolotaya Sopka). The project can be financed with participation of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, BRICS New Development Bank, Eurasian Development Bank, Silk Road Fund and Russia-China Investment Fund, according to Russian Railways. (TASS)

China recruits 30,000 teachers, police, civil servants to move to Xinjiang
Chinese authorities in the troubled northwestern region of Xinjiang have launched a massive nationwide recruitment drive seeking tens of thousands of new police officers, civil servants, teachers, academics, and airline staff. Dangling incentives like free housing, household registration documents, and bonuses, the Xinjiang regional government alone is recruiting more than 12,000 staff out of the 30,000 or more jobs now on offer. Most of the jobs listed by the search engine Sohu require applicants to pass a "political test," while the scope of the advertising and benefits appears geared to majority Han Chinese from elsewhere in the country. RFA

Canadian Journalist Briefly Detained in Xinjiang
Canadian journalist Nathan VanderKlippe, The Globe and Mail’s Beijing-based Asia correspondent, was detained in Elishku Township, Xinjiang on August 23 for over three hours. VanderKlippe in 2014 won an Amnesty International media award for his reporting on Uyghur repression and violence in Xinjiang amid an ongoing terror crackdown in the region. His detention came as foreign journalists in China are experiencing increased harassment, and as state security policies in Xinjiang continue to tighten. (chinadigitaltimes.net)

Loudspeakers from mosques removed in Qinghai to eliminate noise
The Hualong Hui Autonomous County in Northwest China's Qinghai Province has removed over 1,000 loudspeakers from mosques to eliminate noise pollution, according to a report by local newspaper Haidong Times.Loudspeakers were removed from 355 mosques within three days recently in the county with a large Muslim population which is under Haidong city, according to a Friday report that was later deleted. A screen grab of the report is still circulated online.The report said the Hualong government has organized various departments and institutions including the Islamic Association to tackle noise pollution caused by numerous local mosques. (Global Times)

China's Other New Security Concern -- Its Ethnic Kyrgyz
Earlier this month, Qishloq Ovozi looked at China's recent worries about its ethnic Kazakhs and now there is information China has similar concerns about its ethnic Kyrgyz citizens.The Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz are Turkic peoples and the vast majority are Muslims, two distinctions from Han Chinese that are the reasons for Beijing's relatively newfound and increasing unease. (rferl)

Exclusive: China's 'big four' banks raise billions for Belt and Road deals - sources
China's largest state-owned commercial banks are raising tens of billions of dollars to fund the country's Belt and Road investment push, according to people familiar with the matter, bolstering Beijing's ambitions as private capital pulls back. (Reuters)

Is China Winning the Scramble for Eurasia?
Roads, railways and other new connections are reshaping the Eurasian supercontinent and creating new forms of competition as well as cooperation. (National Interest)


CENTRAL ASIA

Russian tanker cuts through Arctic to Asia in record time
A Russian-owned tanker, built to traverse the frozen waters of the Arctic, completed a journey from Europe to Asia in record time this month, auguring well for the future of shipping as global warming melts sea ice. The Christophe de Margerie, a 300m tanker built specifically for the journey, became the first ship to complete the Northern Sea Route without the aid of specialised ice-breaking vessels, said the ship's owner, Sovcomflot, in a statement. (straitstimes)

Kyrgyzstan: Prosecutions Thin Ranks of Presidential Contenders
Two major names in Kyrgyzstani politics have been sentenced to long terms in jail so far in August. Local analysts contend the cases are politically motivated.With presidential election coming up in mid-October, analysts argue the timing of the convictions is not coincidental. They suggest that the cases likely were intended to help members of the ruling elite retain their grip on power. (Eurasianet)

Dushanbe police stop 8,000 women for failing to wear veil correctly
Campaign to "correct" mode of Islamic dress. According to government sources, the veil is a tool to identify women belonging to terrorist groups. (Asia News)

giovedì 24 agosto 2017

Acrush, la boy band «libera» dal gender


Capelli corti, gambe larghe, mani in tasca e abiti maschili. Quando lo scorso aprile il gruppo musicale Acrush ha lanciato il suo primo singolo contava già oltre 900mila follower sul Twitter cinese Weibo, poco meno della pluripremiata Katy Perry. Un successo insolito per una «boy band» agli esordi, specie se composta interamente da ragazze. Si tratta infatti di cinque ventenni graciline e dall’aspetto androgino, assoldate dalla startup Zhejiang Huati Culture Communication Co. Ltd con l’obiettivo di sfidare la figura stereotipata delle starlet più in voga, come le Shanghai SNH48: sorta di ragazze pon-pon con lunghe code di cavallo, gonnelline e calzini al ginocchio. Tutto un altro stile.

Giustificando l’insolita scelta, l’agente di Acrush, Zhou Xiaobai, ha spiegato alla testata digitale Quartz che lo scopo del quintetto è quello di «sfruttare l’esclusiva bellezza della neutralità di genere. Un particolare senso estetico fine a sé stesso che crediamo possa diventare uno stile alla moda». Una deliberata scelta pubblicitaria che tuttavia si fa indirettamente promotrice di un messaggio spiccatamente rivoluzionario: «sostenere la libertà rigettando le limitazioni imposte dalle cornici» è una dichiarazione d’intenti che lancia il guanto della sfida all’austerità dei costumi sponsorizzata dalla propaganda ufficiale. Soprattutto da quando alla barra del timone siede il presidente Xi Jinping, fautore di una nuova «rivoluzione culturale» volta a mondare i media tradizionali e la blogosfera di tutte quelle sbavature ideologiche non conformi ai valori socialisti. L’omosessualità di certo non lo è. Sebbene le bad girl di Acrush sostengano la propria eterosessualità, preferendo agli attributi di genere un più neutro meishaonian («bella gioventù»), il terreno calpestato dall’inconsueta «boy band» è quantomai scivoloso. Con una fanbase costituita soprattutto da teenager e liceali di sesso femminile, il vezzeggiativo più utilizzato dalle ammiratrici nei loro confronti è quello di laogong («marito»), per intenderci lo stesso affibbiato a Justin Bieber. Nello smentire il perseguimento di finalità gayfriendly, tuttavia, Acrush sembra trarre ispirazione da una tradizione «unisex» con radici nella cultura sinica.

Come sottolineato dalla sessuologa Li Yinhe, dalla guerriera Mulan all’impersonificazione di ruoli femminili da parte di attori maschili nell’Opera di Pechino e Shaoxing, la tradizione cinese ha flirtato con un ambiguo trasformismo fino ai giorni nostri. Talvolta con successo. È il caso di Li Yunchun, che grazie al suo look mascolino nel 2005 ha vinto il talentSuper Girl aprendo la strada a un nuovo ideale di donna androgina. Nel corso degli anni Li, è diventata una delle star cinesi più popolari. Ascesa forse spianata da quella familiarità tutta asiatica nei confronti di una bellezza asessuata che sul versante maschile trova la sua massima espressione nei «flower boy» – giovani efebici di cui le soap cinesi e taiwanesi strabordano – e nelle relazioni omosessuali degli anime giapponesi yaoi (Boy’s Love).

Qui la dimensione delle allusioni sfocia in relazioni omosessuali esplicite, senza tuttavia perdere una sua innocenza. «Non si tratta di porno gay per omosessuali e lesbiche. Pur essendo etero, adoro la purezza dell’amore tra ragazzi», spiega una giovane cinese al New Yorker, lamentando la complessità dei rapporti amorosi tradizionali nell’ex Celeste Impero, soggetti all’ingerenza delle famiglie e corrotti da meschini calcoli economici. Colpa della filosofia confuciana, colpevole di accrescere la pressione emotiva attribuendo a ogni individuo una precisa collocazione e responsabilità sociale sulla base del genere, della classe e dell’età. Al contempo, la rigida separazione maschi-femmine, cui sono sottoposti i bambini fino al liceo, si traduce in una reciproca diffidenza tra i sessi che spinge molte adolescenti a preferire una realtà femminile come Acrush a una classica boy band composta da – seppur poco virili – uomini.

Ma la popolarità non è immune dalle critiche e non tutti sembrano apprezzare l'aticipità del quintetto del Zhejiang. Non per nulla secondo Quartz il 25% dei follower del gruppo sarebbe in realtà composto da accaniti "haters".

(Pubblicato su il manifesto)

domenica 20 agosto 2017

China Overseas Investment Curb Exposes Splits in Government


Wang Jianlin displayed considerable composure and self-confidence when facing questions about the recent sale of his theme park and hotel assets to smaller rivals Sunac China Holdings and Guangzhou R&F Properties. But Wang, the founder of China’s largest real estate developer Dalian Wanda Group and formerly China’s richest man, may actually have something to fear.

“Wanda will respond to the state’s call and has decided to keep its main investment within China, said Wang, who recently slipped to third in the Bloomberg Billionaires Index, alluding to the latest Beijing warnings about China’s biggest-ever foreign acquisition frenzy.

Late last year, China’s Ministry of Commerce and the Banking Regulatory Commission began scrutinizing overseas investments in real estate, hotels, film studios, entertainment and sports clubs amid a government crackdown on capital outflow, money laundering and an aggressive campaign to check financial risks ahead of the 19th party congress. The crackdown has overwhelmed several corporations including Wanda, HNA Group, Anbang Insurance, Fosun International and Zhejiang Luosen, which was behind the purchase of A.C. Milan football club.

In mid-June, the regulatory commission began requiring banks to check credit exposure to the five companies and prepare risk analyses. Meanwhile, outbound M&A volumes nearly halved in the first six months of 2017, after record spending of US$221 billion on assets overseas ranging from movie studios to football clubs in 2016.

What’s more, Chinese transactions targeting US and European assets have faced delays and even withdrawals as concerns mount over Beijing’s acquisition of critical technology. Since March, China’s overseas purchases have been speeding up somewhat and foreign exchange reserves rose for the fifth month in a row in June, indicating easing capital flight pressure. Yet, Beijing is still far from lowering its guard.

The timing is particularly sensitive. In a few days, the communist leadership will gather at the northeast seaside resort of Beidaihe for its annual policy summit just a couple of months ahead the crucial Party Congress which will determine the power geometry for the next five years and more. Many of the party organs and government are focused on making sure the Congress goes off without a hitch and that there isn‘t any kind of economic or political schism in the months leading up to it. Speculation about an alleged links between Beijing’s iron fist on Chinese shopping abroad and the much-awaited political event is soaring.

Analysts say Beijing is reining in private companies to speed up state-owned enterprises’ “going global process” despite the repeated promise of a more market-driven China. Behind this trend is a struggle between the supporters of a conservative state capitalism and those who hope in a more open market-oriented economy.

Just a few days ago, the State Council ordered all firms controlled by the central government to complete a massive restructuring to become limited liability and joint stock companies by the end of 2017.

This theory, despite its speciousness, is allegedly supported by the direct engagemant of Xi Jinping in the current “witch-hunt” as well as by the latest economic data: the private sector’s share of overseas spending – after shooting up from barely above zero about a decade ago to nearly half of China’s overseas investments in 2016 – slipped back to 36.9 percent in the first half of 2017. At the same time, profits at China’s state-owned firms were up 45.8 percent at RMB805.5 billion in January-June, compared with a 53.3 percent rise in the first five months.

In other words, in 2017 it was mostly traditional sectors, including export manufacturing, real estate, and old-fashioned infrastructure investment, that kept China’s economic growth on track.

Supporting rumors of an internal split, Reuters examined the president’s performance at the recent National Financial Work Conference in an article with an eloquent title (“Xi pours cold water on China’s ‘creativity’ rally“), in which the main focus was put on the growing discrepancy between Premier Li Keqiang’s idealistic inclination for an innovation-led economy and Xi’s preference for pragmatism and stability.
Rumors hinting at a rivalry between the Party’s number one and two are not new. In a recent guide to the 19th Party Congress, Trivium China described Li as the weakest premier since Hua Guofeng (1976-1980), Mao Zedong’s designated successor.

“Over the past five years, much of the premier’s traditional portfolio has been taken over by newly created leading small groups headed by Xi Jinping. What’s more, Li doesn’t seem to be on board with much of Xi’s conservative agenda,” Trivium China reported. Many analysts say Xi would actually prefer to see the loyal anti-corruption czar Wang Qishan (deeply involved in the restructuring of China’s state-owned banking sector in the first decade of this century) take over as Prime Minister.

Nothing can be said for sure, but as Nicholas Hope, former director of the Stanford Center for International Development (SCID), told Asia Sentinel, the nebulous situation should be read and interpreted in the light of two main themes: measures to manage capital inflow and outflow; and ambivalence concerning the role of Chinese SOEs.

From late 2006 through June 2014, Chinese foreign exchange reserves quadrupled to about US$4 trillion. One of the reasons for that was sustained capital inflow (along with undesirably high current account surpluses), which contributed to exchange rate appreciation and created management problems for the monetary authorities.

In turn, that encouraged more liberal approaches to capital outflow, including for private citizens who spent large sums on tourism, shopping abroad, education for their children and even acquisition of foreign assets, especially housing. At the same time, the government encouraged large firms to invest abroad and there was a tremendous upsurge in outward direct investment which doubled to around US$170 billion during 2013-16.After the government widened the trading band for the renminbi in August 2015 (probably as part of its successful campaign to persuade the International Monetary Fund to include the renminbi in the SDR basket), the currency drifted downwards to the surprise and consternation of some American observers. To date, the government has spent about US$1 trillion of its reserves to arrest the decline and ensure that the rate moves in an orderly way that minimizes trade disruption.

The liberal approach to capital flows has been reversed with controls being enforced more stringently and greater efforts being made to ensure that funds leaving the country are not simple capital flight, with firms and households seeking to diversify their asset holdings and/or guard against further depreciation.

“China being China, the government has also intervened to prevent investments that it might view as ‘frivolous’ or ‘prestige’ projects (sports teams, entertainment industry, hotels and resorts), especially where it perceives these investments, whether made by private or state-owned companies, as contributing to an undesirable build up in indebtedness of the investing entities to Chinese banks (themselves government owned)”, said Nicholas Hope. “My view is that often the government is not an especially reliable judge of whether or not these investments promise good returns”.

On the more intricate question of SOEs, the former director of the Stanford Center’s China research program raises an even more sensitive point. While it is impossible to prove the ongoing political fight, Hope said, there is considerable evidence substantiating a certain form of disharmony inside the party.

“My observation over the past several years, vindicated by the public disagreements in several conferences of participants who represent different arms of government, is that there is indeed,” said Hope, “unresolved tension between those who believe that innovation and economic dynamism would be served best by privatizing the SOEs or, at least, exposing them to more competition, and those who still see the SOEs as the pillars of the economy and the main sources of R&D that will drive further growth or, at least, as the way in which the party will retain control of the commanding heights of the economy. Within the two competing positions there are many nuances, with the self-interest of many powerful factions influencing current opinion and vying for the deciding voice in the ultimate outcome”.

But this may not be enough to support the thesis of a radical U-turn on the so-called “supply side reform.” “I don’t see this issue as a deliberate attempt to restrict the rise of private firms, and I believe the government is taking measure to encourage smaller firms to thrive”, Hope said. “But big private outfits in China (Alibaba, Wanda, TenCent, Baidu, Didi) are at best quasi-private as the party ensures that it retains a big voice in how those firms operate and some of them have been equally affected by restrictions on their acquisitions abroad as the SOEs.”

After all, in China, the line that separates the public from the private sphere is extremely thin. We only need to look at the top of Alibaba, HNA, Wanda and Anbang to find well-connected magnates, with guanxi that stretches from the former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping to the Politburo and nothing less than members of President Xi Jinping’s family.


(Scritto per Asia Sentinel)

mercoledì 2 agosto 2017

Nati per combattere: gli orfani dell'Enbo Fight Club


video sta facendo il giro del web cinese: due bambini di appena 14 anni combattono dentro una gabbia di ferro armati di guantoni. Intorno a loro una folla di scommettitori incoraggia animatamente il proprio “campione” alla vittoria. È uno spezzone tratto da un recente documentario dedicato all’Enbo Fight Clubdi Chengdu (provincia del Sichuan), struttura che fornisce un militaresco training nell’MMA (Mixed Martial Arts), fondata nel 1995 da un ex funzionario della polizia di etnia tibetana. Nel 2001, con l’istituzione della Enbo Charity il club ha avviato un programma di accoglienza per gli orfani e i bambini poveri — molti originari dell’arretrata prefettura autonoma di Liangshan — con l’obiettivo di sottrarli alla criminalità. Da allora, l’Enbo Fight Club ha addestrato al combattimento circa 400 orfani, di cui 150 ancora presenti presso la struttura, dotata di un dormitorio da 40 camerecon tv e aria condizionata. Per molti la vita al “Fight Club” di Chengdu è meno dura che a casa.

I due giovanissimi atleti, Xiao Long e Xiao Wu, sognano di vincere l’Ultimate Fighting Championship di Las Vegas (la più importante organizzazione nel campo delle MMA a livello globale) e a tornare indietro non ci pensano nemmeno. “Qui c’è tutto: cibo, vestiti e un posto dove vivere. Il cibo è molto meglio che a casa. Ci danno manzo e uova, qui, mentre a casa mangerei solo patate e sarei costretto a trovarmi un lavoro di fatica”, racconta alle telecamere del Youtube cinese Pear Video il piccolo Wu, che tre anni fa è stato spedito presso l’insolito ricovero dalla nonna alla morte di entrambi i genitori. Ma “talvolta l’allenamento è talmente faticoso che mi verrebbe voglia di non praticare mai più”, aggiunge. Sullo sfondo scorrono immagini forti: bambini colpiscono il sacco madidi di sudore, esercitano il combattimento corpo a corpo con il naso sporco di sangue. Quando picchiano troppo duro una voce fuori campo li invita alla cautela.

Capita che qualcuno decida di andarsene a causa dell’insopportabile stanchezza, spiega il personale di Enbo. A chi resiste, tuttavia, si aprono ghiotte possibilità di carriera. Gli alunni migliori si sono affermati nelle competizioni a livello nazionale e alcuni hanno anche trovato un impiego come bodyguard. Una spiegazione che non è bastata a tenere lontano i riflettori di media e autorità. Come confermato al Beijing Youth Dailydall’amministratore del club Zhu Guanghui, la polizia sta già investigando sul caso. Due sono i punti più controversi: la gestione da parte della struttura degli incassi (“quando [i bambini] hanno bisogno di soldi, glieli diamo”, sostiene il coach Wang Zhou) e la procedura di adozione.

Stando a quanto affermato nel documentario dal boss Enbo, i piccoli vengono mandati al “Fight Club” con “documentazioneformale” e il beneplacito dell’Ufficio per gli Affari Civili, mentre quelli ritenuti non idonei al training finiscono per essere riconsegnati alle cure dello Stato. Eppure, come fa notare il tabloid Global Times, non solo la legge cinese sulla protezione dei minori concede all’adottante la possibilità di prendere con sé un solo bambino. Secondo la Legge sulla Pubblica Sicurezza, “organizzare o costringere persone che non hanno raggiunto l’età di 16 anni, o che sono disabili, a eseguire performance terrificanti o disumane, o attirare tali persone a fornire questo tipo di prestazioni” è illegale. Le indagini stanno, inoltre, verificando possibili infrazioni della legge sull’istruzione obbligatoria. “Gli orfani possono permettersi di andare a scuola, perché sono esclusi dal pagamento delle tasse e godono anche di un’indennità“, ha dichiarato Lin Shucheng, segretario del Partito di Liangshan.

Negli ultimi anni, la condizione degli orfani e dei “left-behind children” — sono 61 milioni i “bambini lasciati indietro” dai genitori immigrati in altre parti del paese in cerca di lavoro — ha ripetutamente conquistato l’attenzione dell’opinione pubblica cinese. Il video, pubblicato il 21 luglio, nel giro di pochi giorni ha ricevuto più di 12 milioni di visualizzazioni sul popolare sito Miaopai, mentre in migliaia hanno commentato la storia sulla piattaforma di microblogging Sina Weibo, esprimendo opinioni contrastanti. “Imparare a combattere fin da giovani offre loro una prospettiva per il futuro. Non credo ci sia nulla di male”, scrive un internauta conquistandosi oltre 2000 like. “[Questi bambini] dovrebbero essere a scuola, invece sono già entrati nel mondo del profitto”, controbatte un altro, “la regola della sopravvivenza insegna loro che chi vince prende tutto. È una cosa deplorevole. Dove sono le autorità in tutto questo?!”

[Pubblicato su Il Fatto quotidiano online]

Hukou e controllo sociale

Quando nel 2012 mi trasferii a Pechino per lavoro, il più apprezzabile tra i tanti privilegi di expat non era quello di avere l’ufficio ad...